God was once posited as the cause of many naturalistic phenomena, true. But people didn't believe in God because "what else could cause earthquakes?" They believed in God because they witnessed miracles - events that were clearly not naturalistic, by the standards of any time - or believed people who witnessed miracles and were ready to die rather than deny the truth of their beliefs.
The "god of the gaps" accusation is in most cases a straw man. I don't know of any Christians who believe in God because of a "god of the gaps" argument. If any do, I'm sure they are few and far between. The first cause argument is definitely not a "god of the gaps" argument. It depends not on the current state of scientific knowledge, but on reasoning which was as true 1000 years ago as it is now, and will be 1000 years in the future. Can you find any point in my argument that depends on a current lack of scientific knowledge?
My apologies, I did not know of these professional philosophers; I thought I would be able to find their work easily if it existed. These might have given the first cause argument due attention, but the question is whether the majority of atheist philosophers do so. But even if they do, if their arguments are not convincing, they must be mistaken.
I'm sorry I wasn't clear enough - The first cause argument is not at all irrelevant to my belief in God; it is simply one of many. A table with 12 legs will not fall because one is removed. I think the first cause argument is the one that will be most convincing in this discussion.
I'm not sure I understand your definition of empirical necessity. You used as an example: "One can imagine that either I fathered children or I didn't, but in actuality, only one of those things can be true."
You can logically imagine that you fathered children or that you didn't - but you can only logically imagine that one of those is true at a time. You can only logically imagine that one of these is true in reality, though you may not know which one. If you do know which one, then you can only logically imagine that the one that is true in reality is true in reality; but you can still logically imagine how it could have been different had the universe been different. Which part is the empirical necessity that is different from logical necessity?
You said, "we can imagine the first cause to be X or Y (or Z, etc), but in actuality it can only be one of those things." I agree, though my proof shows that we can only logically imagine the first cause to be X - nothing else will suffice.
You said, "it doesn't follow that being wholly independent of anything in the actual omniverse means something must exist in all possible omniverses." I disagree. I will reformulate my proof of this from my last post:
Let's look at the actual first cause of our actual omniverse. We know that, since it is a first cause, it must depend on nothing in the actual omniverse for its existence. Then, it must depend on itself for its existence. I argue that this means that it must exist by its very nature. In something's nature is contained how it behaves. So the fact that the first cause depends on itself for its existence must be a part of the first cause's nature. Therefore, it exists by its very nature.
You argued that the first cause doesn't have to exist in all possible universes. So let's imagine we are in one of the logically possible omniverses where the first cause does not exist. (from here to the end of the paragraph is the same proof from my last post) But this causes a logical contradiction, for now we are saying that this first cause, which exists by its very nature, does not exist. How could it not exist if it exists by its very nature? Could it be that its existence explains its existence, and its nonexistence explains its nonexistence? By no means! For unless the first cause's nature suddenly changes; it cannot both exist by its very nature and not exist by its very nature. And if its nature changes, then it is a totally different first cause, and proves nothing about the original first cause. Then we would be saying that the original first cause exists by its very nature in one possible omniverse, and a different first cause does not exist by its very nature in the second omniverse. And how can something not exist by its very nature? Something that does not exist does not have a nature at all!
So we know that the First Cause must exist in all possible universes. From this follows everything I proved in my last post; namely, that the First Cause must be God.
If the laws of physics ceased to exist, then it's not that atoms would cease to exist. It's that it doesn't make sense to separate atoms and the laws of physics in the first place, because laws are not an actual thing that exists, but rather descriptions of how actual things that exist operate. If the laws of physics ceased to exist, that means that how atoms behave ceases to exist, which doesn't make sense. How something behaves is part of the nature of its existence. It doesn't make sense to separate it, but neither does it make sense for how something behaves to cause its existence, unless that thing is the first cause, which holds itself in existence. Are you therefore arguing that everything in the universe holds itself in existence?
The first cause argument is not at all incompatible with free will. Any decision a human makes has that human's "I" - a free-willed being - as its cause. That free-willed being has its cause in being created by God as a free-willed being.
Since you do not believe in God, it makes sense that you do not believe in free will (or objective morality) either. But doesn't this mean that life is meaningless? That a human is really no more meaningful than a rock? That everything we do and choose in life doesn't matter at all? That our relationships with other people are totally meaningless; that the only difference between an act of charity and an act of hatred are how much pleasure you receive from each of them? If you "find your own meaning", then you do it with the knowledge that you're just lying to yourself to feel better about the pointlessness of the universe.
But I believe that "not a tear is wasted" (Casting Crowns). Every moment of suffering has a purpose. I believe that the choices we make will ripple into eternity. Everything we do is meaningful. The universe was created by a loving God, who is Goodness, Truth, and Beauty itself. Who loved us so much that He became one of us so He could suffer and die to offer us the gift of eternal life. I believe that we should always strive to do good, not evil, because we love our God, who has given us all that we have that is good. If we live for Him, instead of ourselves, our restless hearts will finally find total fulfillment in God. He is the Happiness we are searching for when we pursue all the pleasures in the world, only to find that each leaves us empty in the end. And He welcomes us Home with open arms, if only we turn to meet him.
You said, "In terms of capabilities becoming more advanced over time, it's not so much about time itself as the idea that advanced capabilities require more primitive capabilities to build upon." But doesn't "the idea that advanced capabilities require more primitive capabilities to build upon" only make sense within time? God's advanced capabilities do not come from nowhere - they simply always were there. They are who He is; uncaused as He is, since He is the First Cause. I think that something primitive causing everything is what seems highly unlikely, not something advanced. Suppose you saw a robot that starts off with the capabilities of a bug, but then slowly learns more and more until it is as capable as a human? Would you guess that the robot was built by a bug? Or isn't it far more logical that that robot was built by a human, or something far more intelligent than a human? This sort of evolution from primitive to advanced is precisely what we see in our universe. Is it really logical to think that this incredibly complex system was caused by something less capable than a bug? I think it far more reasonable to think that the universe was created by the infinitely simple (indivisible) yet infinitely knowledgeable and infinitely capable God.
You said, "sure, if we throw out all experience, evidence, observations, and anything else we can verify, and posit a realm where anything is possible as long as it's not a logical contradiction, then we can make up whatever we want. But that's an act of imagination, not reason." If you're speaking of scientific evidence, then I have not contradicted it in any way. I've only not used it for the simple reason that it just doesn't pertain to my logical proof. You make it sound as if I am saying that unicorns exist without any proof just because their existence is logically possible. But I'm not at all saying that God exists for no reason other than that it is logically possible. I'm showing how God's existence is logically necessary. How, if logic stands, God exists. That is reason, not imagination.
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