There are big differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. They have the same center, but it definitely is a large jump to convert between them. The reason the Protestant 84% is so high is because there are at least 200 different Protestant denominations in the United States. Some are similar, but many are very different. Anyone rejecting the beliefs of their parents and switching to a new Protestant denomination is not counted in this data.
Yes, one of the keys of being rational is indeed constant vigilance with regards to our own biases. Once, I believed a semi-Protestant theology because I wanted it to be true, was not very knowledgeable, and didn't look too deeply into the issue. But one day I realized, as I learned more, that I had to rationally seek the truth, and choose the one belief system that I believed to be the true one. So I researched, and Catholicism always had an answer for any charge anyone tried to lay against it.
I have been blessed to have never really doubted God's existence. But I have never found a rational reason to do so. And I have tried to not run away from arguments for atheism, but rather towards them to confront them, for I know that the best way to find the truth is through discussion and through the confrontation of ideas with each other. I strive to take the harder path in reason; if any important theological questions arise in my mind, I strive to answer them, not dismiss them.
In your challenges against my firm confidence in God's existence, we must be careful about playing a game of ifs. I believe the First Cause argument is true; you don't. You ask what I would do if the First Cause argument was false, but I don't believe it to be false, and we are still discussing it. If the First Cause argument is wholly logical, it might be like saying "if 1+1 equaled 3, then what would 1+3 equal?" There is no real logical answer to this question, because the question presupposes a falsehood. We have not concluded yet whether your question supposes a falsehood, but if it does, then its answer might be equally nonsensical. Currently, I am still 97% certain that the First Cause Argument holds up.
But, given the above, I still definitely have to thank you very much for pushing me to clarify my fundamental understanding of the interplay between reason and faith. I have looked more deeply into the matter, and I have discovered that you are right, in a sense - my belief is not fully dependent upon rational argumentation, though I am convinced that rational argumentation fully supports my belief. I know God exists by reason; since I know of different proofs of God which build from clear, intuited truths to the existence of God, including the one we are discussing. But my belief in God is not dependent on my reasoning.
Is, then, my belief dependent upon the subrational - emotions, feelings, and desires? Absolutely not; one might as well base one's beliefs on what one had for breakfast this morning or which way the wind happens to be blowing today. No, my belief is based on the superrational - on the supernatural gift of Faith.
I'm sure you can't see how a supernatural gift of Faith could be trustworthy, which makes sense in your worldview, since you don't think there is anything higher than reason in leading us to truth. So I think we should definitely continue our discussion from the standpoint of Reason, since this is a way of getting to truth that we both trust. But I will briefly explain how trust in supernatural Faith is not unreasonable (though I will use reason to explain it, since that is our common language).
How can I trust anything above reason? There is no reason to do so! But of course there at least need not be a reason to do so - that's part of what it means to be above reason. You are assuming that reason is the only way to see truth, and that truth cannot be offered as a gift to us by a higher being (God, Who is Truth).
But how do we know the superrational will not mislead us into believing falsehoods? There are many people who have faith in falsehoods. Therefore, isn't faith untrustworthy? True Faith is the acceptance of truth as a gift from a higher being (God) in accordance with reason. False "faith" is either an unexamined, irrational belief based on the subrational (desires, emotions, feelings), or an examined belief based on mistaken reasoning (we are fallible, after all). I can examine myself and see that my faith is not based on reasoning or the subrational - so it must be based on the superrational. But what if my belief, despite being examined, is actually secretly, unbeknownst to me, based on the subrational - perhaps based on a desire to feel safe, a coping mechanism for the fear of death, and a desire to have certainty about things? Then wouldn't contemplating this fill me with dread, or a horrifying ring of truth about myself, rather than cement my confidence even further in that my faith is a gift from God, as it truly does? Perhaps I am totally irrational; too far gone; perhaps I am caught in a complex psychological delusion which is keeping me hostage. But then, so is the majority of humanity throughout all history who has also believed in God by Faith. Is it likely that we are all suffering under such a complex psychological delusion?
This syllogistic proof also shows how Faith can, and actually must, come before reason:
How do we know we can trust our reason?
- We cannot trust our reason based on the subrational (emotions, feelings, desires) because it is irrational to base trust in a greater on a lesser.
- We cannot trust our reason because of any reasoned proof, because then we are begging the question.
- We can't choose to not trust our reason at all, because it goes against our very nature. Even to choose to be doubtful about everything is to say that you know by reason that everything is doubtful.
- So we must trust our reason because of the superrational - because of faith that our reason leads to truth.
- If our reason leads to truth, our reason cannot come from a deceiving or ignorant mind.
- If our reason leads to truth, our reason cannot come from complete randomness, for even though it is possible, though highly, highly unlikely that complete randomness could just happen to create a rational mind with reason that leads to truth, we have no way of knowing if we humans have indeed had the good luck to be granted by random chance the reason that leads to truth rather than a reason which seems sort of like the reason that leads to truth but actually does not lead to truth.
- Then our reason must come from a truthful, all-knowing mind - from God.
- Then we must have Faith that God exists.
To be clear, my Faith in God is not contingent upon this proof or any other, because it is a supernatural gift - but this proof shows how it can be reasonable that Faith is more trustworthy than reason.
But Reason is always in accord with Faith, for both lead to the truth.
Now, to continue discussing Reason:
I still think it is rational, even from a perspective only reliant upon reason, to not lower confidence in a belief because one strong argument is refuted. A square table only needs 4 legs to stand and be fully stable. From a certain perspective it is closer to collapsing with 11 instead of 12 legs. But it is no less stable. There is no need to be less confident that gravity exists if you see one apple fly upwards. Clearly, it's an anomaly, an outlier. It's more likely that it is a flying apple (or is on a string) than that gravity does not exist. There is no need to get less confident in something as all-encompassing and that makes so much sense in explaining so much as gravity because one test fails. Likewise, there is no need to get less confident in something as all-encompassing and that makes so much sense in explaining so much as the existence of God because one proof fails.
Here are 12 strong arguments for the existence of God (though you must promise for now to focus only on the one we are currently discussing, as to focus on too many would lead our discussion posts to be much too long):
- The Argument from Causality (what we are discussing here)
- Argument from Consciousness
- Argument from Eternal Truths
- Argument from the Origin of the Idea of God
- Argument from Design
- Argument from Miracles
- Argument from Morality
- Argument from Desire
- Argument from Religious Experience
- Argument from Common Consent
- Argument from the Nature of Humanity
- Argument from the Existence of Reason (I went briefly through this above in discussing Faith)
There are more proofs of God as well, not on this list. But since I began with the arbitrary number 12 in my example I chose 12 for this list. Brief explanations of many of these 12 are on this list of 20 proofs: https://strangenotions.com/god-exists/
Neither list is all-comprehensive.
Different arguments seem stronger to different people, because different people start from different worldviews with different premises. For example, someone who believes morality cannot be at heart just a fiction might find the Argument from Morality strong, while you would not. But your belief in a First Cause being logical makes the First Cause argument (the Argument from Causality) more likely to seem strong to you.
There is definitely a large disconnect on the following point, which must be one of understanding. This is highly important since this point concerns the primary argument we are discussing. I hope I'm understanding your argument properly and making my argument clear enough; I apologize if I'm failing in clarity. I hope the following explanation helps us understand each other:
I believe that your argument #9 is where the issue with your syllogism lies. I see a logical leap there that seems unjustified.
Yes, the causal chains are completely independent of each other. But what is the start of every causal chain in every omniverse? That omniverse's First Cause. And why does that First Cause exist? Because of attribute N: it exists by its very nature, it causes itself to exist. This means that it has to exist, no matter what, and that nothing can ever stop it from existing, because it causes itself to exist and is itself the cause of everything else.
You're right, the two possible omniverses do not and cannot interact. But since a first cause is self-existing by its very nature - by its very nature causes itself to exist - it must necessarily never possibly not exist, which means that it must cause itself to exist in every possible omniverse. For if it could not exist in a possible omniverse, it would be failing to cause itself to exist in that possible omniverse, which means that its existence would not be contingent upon itself since it would be possible that it could not exist, which means that it could not be self existing, which means that it could not be a first cause.
So why can't two different First Causes, N+X and N+Y exist in different logically possible omniverses? They can, but only if X = Y.
Let's continue from your argument. I will paste the beginning of your argument here for convenience, but adding in the names A and B for the possible omniverses:
1) The term "omniverse" is defined as everything which actually exists.
2) Thus, the omniverse can't interact with anything outside itself, since by definition, nothing exists outside the omniverse.
3) Therefore, any possible omniverse one can imagine must contain a causal chain that is independent from the causal chain in any other possible omniverse one can imagine.
4) A "first cause" is defined as a thing which is uncaused, i.e. it exists by its own nature. This is the necessary attribute of a first cause. We will call it attribute N.
5) Thus, the first cause in any possible omniverse must have attribute N.
6) However, the first cause in a given omniverse may have additional attributes.
7) Therefore, we can imagine an omniverse A with a first cause with attribute N plus attribute X. We will call this first cause N+X.
8) But we can also imagine a different omniverse B with a first cause with attribute N plus attribute Y. We will call this first cause N+Y.
Granted. Now, for my continuation.
The following step, #9, is the crux of my argument, so I have composed it into 3 different "sub-syllogisms" which all lead to the same conclusion; my #9 in my main syllogism.
9) N+X, since it is a first cause, must exist in all possible omniverses (this is the conclusion of the following sub-syllogisms).
Sub-syllogism A:
1) N+X causes itself to exist. Its existence depends only on itself; not on the necessity that some first cause must exist.
2) No separate causal chain can stop it from existing because it itself is the beginning of a causal chain and needs nothing else other than itself to cause itself to exist. It does not need to interact with another omniverse to cause itself to exist in every possible omniverse, it just has to be impossible that it could have not existed.
3) Not impossible that some first cause could have not existed, but impossible that this specific first cause could have not existed.
4) For if it is only impossible that some first cause could have not existed, the necessity of that first cause's existence would be contingent upon the existence of an omniverse which it has to hold in existence, which is nonsensical.
5) But if it is impossible that this specific first cause N+X could have not existed, its existence is dependent only upon itself, so it always exists no matter what; it is impossible for it to have not existed, i.e. it must exist in all possible omniverses.
Sub-syllogism B:
1) Suppose it were possible for a first cause, N+Z, to never have existed (i.e. to not exist in at least one possible omniverse). Then, what is the difference between Omniverse M where N+Z exists and Omniverse N where N+Z does not exist which could logically allow N+Z to not exist?
2) It cannot be a change in N+Z, because then we have changed the topic from talking about N+Z to, say N+Z+C (a completely different first cause with different attributes).
3) What else can it be, then, but a change in something in each omniverse that is not N+Z?
4) But if a change in the rest of the omniverse can cause N+Z to not exist, then N+Z's existence is not contingent upon itself, but upon whatever causes it to exist, which means that N+Z cannot then be a first cause. We have reached a self-contradiction.
5) So the true First Cause, say N+X, must exist in every possible omniverse.
Sub-syllogism C:
1) Suppose a first cause, N+Z, exists in Omniverse M, but does not exist in Omniverse N.
2) Then why does N+Z exist in Omniverse M? This is a logical question - since N+Z does not exist in Omniverse N, it is possible that N+Z might not have existed in Omniverse M either.
3) Because it just does? That's not a logical answer.
4) Because it causes itself to exist? Yes, this is the right answer since it is a first cause, and this is the necessary attribute N of a first cause.
5) But why, then, does N+Z cause itself to exist in Omniverse M but not in Omniverse N?
6) Because it holds itself in existence once it already exists, but cannot bring itself into existence if it does not exist? And it exists in Omniverse M so it can hold itself in existence there, but it does not exist in Omniverse N so it cannot hold itself in existence there because it does not exist to do so? This sounds reasonable at first.
7) But if N+Z has the power to hold itself in existence once it already exists but not the power to bring itself into existence (speaking metaphorically, since it is in eternity; meaning something like perpetually bringing itself into existence), then something else has to be the cause that has the power to bring it into existence or not do so.
8) But then N+Z cannot be a first cause, and we have contradicted ourselves.
(N.B. More literally speaking, for a first cause, the power to bring itself into existence and the power to hold itself in existence are really exactly the same power. This is because a first cause exists in eternity, outside of time - which is an "eternal now". More like a frozen moment of time than anything else, I think. Then, the first cause causes its own existence once and for all in this "frozen moment" and thereby remains existing forever.)
Back to the main Syllogism:
10) So N+X causes itself to exist in omniverse B as well as omniverse A. Then N+X and N+Y must co-exist in omniverse B.
11) But Omniverse B could exist with only one First Cause. In other words, there exists a possible Omniverse C where only N+X is the First Cause of an Omniverse that is otherwise exactly the same as Omniverse B.
12) But that means that N+Y does not hold itself in existence in Omniverse C.
13) So N+Y cannot hold itself in existence in any omniverse, including Omniverse B.
14) So N+X is the only First Cause, and exists in all possible omniverses.
Math does not exist in a void - math exists as an aspect of the nature of God. Physical laws exist as an aspect of the nature of physical things. God does not exist in a void - He is Existence Itself, the very opposite of a void. There is certainly no "void" surrounding God, who is Infinite. We find this hard to imagine, since we can only imagine things in 3 dimensions of space. Saying God exists does not require a rule of a void being nonexistence to be broken at all. Which makes more sense - to say that nothing becomes unstable (how can *nothing* be unstable? Or be anything? How does it make sense to apply an adjective to nothing?) and somehow creates something (that something never comes out of nothing is one of the most fundamental logical truths), or to say that Pure Existence created all that exists besides Himself?
It is not meaningless to say that God is good by nature because God's goodness is not relative to anything else - it is absolute goodness. Even if God were the only one in existence, he would still be clearly all-good, all-powerful, all-beautiful, and Love Itself. Why? Because God is that above which nothing greater could ever possibly exist.
If there was a piece of metal in the void and it was a certain heat, you're right, it wouldn't make much sense to call it 50 degrees Celsius, because there is no water to freeze or boil to compare with it. But if that piece of metal was Infinitely Hot, we could, by use of our reason, recognize that piece of metal as something above which nothing could ever possible be hotter.
You said: "What else are we basing the choice on then? It doesn't make sense to say we are basing it on free will. That's like saying we are basing our choice on our ability to make choices. It seems to me that anything you can imagine factoring into your choice (moral upbringing, fear of jail, innate sense of justice instilled by God, etc) is part of a causal chain that stretches back to the beginning of the universe (or beyond). So if everything you are basing your decision on was set in motion before your birth, how can you be responsible for it?"
Because you are still the one making the decision.
I didn't mean to say our choices are not based on external factors. Our choices are indeed based on external factors - it is these factors that we assess when we make choices. But just because everything we factor into our choice is "part of a causal chain that stretches back to the beginning of the universe (or beyond)" does not mean that these factors are our choices. They are what we decide about; they do not make our decisions for us. A computer does not weigh options and think about them and choose what to do; it just does something immediately based on the external factors, because it runs on pure programming. Humans look at external factors and must first decide what to do. No, our choices aren't based on free will itself. They are not completely arbitrary. They are made about external factors. But they are choices, not preprogrammed automatic responses to external stimuli.
Because everything we make choices about is part of that causal chain, we are not directly responsible for each crossroad we come across in our lives. But we are directly responsible for which path we choose to go down.
We have to be careful not to mix up predictability with freedom. If you give someone free tickets to their favorite band on a night you know they are free, you may be 95% certain that they will be there because of your analysis of external stimuli. But how does that make their choice to go to the concert any less free?
*credit to Bishop Robert Barron for the above argument
At any moment, I could decide to do something completely nonsensical against all external stimuli - I could run around in circles in McDonalds clucking like a chicken for no reason whatsoever. Anyone can predict with something like 99.9% certainty that I will not choose to do that, (assuming they know I have no rational reason to do so, like humour or a prank). But I still could. I still have the freedom do go ahead and run around McDonalds clucking like a chicken for no reason, and possibly get arrested for disturbing the peace. I won't. But I could. So I know I have free will.
I used the word "perfect" in a loose manner. Of course we live in an imperfect world. But we still see an incredible amount of order. Why do we see so much order, yet also some chaos? Christianity has the answer, in the Doctrine of the Fall. Humanity turned away from God, and humanity and all of nature, which is humanity's domain, became imperfect. If you see a broken car by the side of the road, you would assume that humans built this car at some point and then it broke down. You wouldn't assume that by a freak accident of nature the physical materials that usually resemble a car just happened to fall into the right places so that a car was assembled. If you see the word "Hello" spelled out on the ground with marbles, but you see some marbles are out of place so that the "Hello" is kind of messy, you would assume that someone wrote "Hello" with marbles and then some of them happened to roll away afterwards. You wouldn't assume that the marbles had been spilled on the ground by accident and just happened to messily spell the word "Hello." Likewise, since we see so much order in the universe, yet with imperfection, the most reasonable conclusion is that it is an intelligent design that has gone wrong - not that it is the result of random chance.